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Abstract: The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the dubious assumptions about language 
and meaning hidden in the dominant accounts of the straw man fallacy. I will argue that against the 
background of the resurgent conception of language as an underdetermined and in-principle negotiable 
entity (Dorr & Hawthorne 2014; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), some alleged straw man 
attacks are better seen as reasonable moves in the metalinguistic disagreements permeating our ordinary 
argumentative practice. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The straw man fallacy is typically defined as a misrepresentation of a discussant’s arguments, and the 
resulting misattribution of their commitments, in order to easier attack and rebut them (Aikin & Casey 
2011, 2016; Lewiński 2011; Lewiński & Oswald 2013; Oswald & Lewiński 2014; de Saussure 2018; 
Schumann, Zufferey, & Oswald 2019; Talisse & Aikin 2006; Walton 1996). The basic rationale behind 
identifying this fallacy – thou shalt not distort thy neigbour’s position – has been well-justified in any 
dialectical approach to argumentation at least since Plato’s Euthyphro: if the meanings of the terms and 
sentences used are not well-defined and consistently used by both discussants, any critical, dialectical 
testing of their opposing positions will turn out to be bogus, futile, or merely verbal at best.  
 The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the assumptions about language hidden in 
the dominant dialectical view on the straw man fallacy. Misrepresentation presupposes there exists a (or 
even the) proper representation of what an arguer said, for instance resorting to conventions of usage or 
speaker intentions. However, given the recently resurging conception of language as an underdetermined 
and in-principle negotiable entity (Allott & Textor 2012; Burgess & Plunket 2013; Dorr & Hawthorne 
2014; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett 2015; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), the straw man seems to be part and 
parcel of many of the metalinguistic disagreements we have in our ordinary argumentative practice. The 
paper will clean up some of the confusions by sketching the possible criteria for distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate forms of metalinguistic disagreements.  
 To start with, is there anything scholarly to be said about the straw man? It is a term commonly 
used in ordinary English, it is about argumentation, it is, arguably, a fallacy, and so argumentation 
scholars are surely supposed to say something about it. But can they say something substantive that goes 
beyond the ordinary, folk treatment? Perhaps I will spoil the fun now, but my argument, while critical, 
will end with the conclusion that they can, and even should. Only then will I be able to move to my 
second point, that of the dialectical background of the straw man, namely, of the extent to which hard 
dialectical questioning can be seen as strawmanning one’s opponent. Does being a sharp and relentless 
critic—a dialectical virtue recognized since Socratic elenchus—not violate another dialectical virtue, that 
of being charitable to one’s opponent? (See esp. Aikin & Casey 2016) And even if it doesn’t, how can we 
distinguish between harsh and even uncomfortable, but altogether reasonable, argumentative interrogation 
from irrelevant nit-picking, quibbling, or “just playing with words,” to use a common expression for 
dialectical exasperation?  
  
 
2. Is straw man a straw concept?  
 
My digital Oxford English Dictionary tells me under the ‘straw man’ entry that it is “an intentionally 
misrepresented proposition that is set up because it is easier to defeat than an opponent’s real argument.” 
Surely, a lot can be said about this definition. First, this definition is replete with complicated words, such 
as “intentionally,” “proposition,” and “because.” Is straw man committed exclusively when one advances 
a fishy “proposition” “because” of one’s “intention” to easier defeat an opponent’s argument? I don’t 
think so—see below for details. Second, it is replete with very complicated words, such as “real 
argument” and “misrepresented.” I think we all get the point here. There are some things we say or at 
least convey in our arguments—and other things we don’t convey, let alone explicitly say. Examples 
abound, and these are the examples typically given in textbooks on fallacies. Many of them are good, 
intelligent, even realistic examples. But often things are not so simple. Especially, claiming that there are 
things such as “real arguments” or “words which mean what they mean”—while possibly useful for 
introductory pedagogical or encyclopedic purposes—is either oblivious to or iconoclastic of the entire 
tradition of semantics and pragmatics. It is, then, surely something to be investigated—and, indeed, below 
I will focus on just that. 
However, a third notable feature of the Oxford English Dictionary definition needs to be noted 
first: no mention of ‘fallacy’ is included there, although it can perhaps be easily inferred as an offense 
against the “real argument.” Fallacies are, in an important sense, simply bad arguments which are also 
characteristically treacherous, in that they hide their own badness (Lewiński & Oswald 2013; Oswald & 
Lewiński 2014). As such, their treatment is, perhaps necessarily so, parasitic on the treatment of good 
arguments and can never stand on its own: “There is no such thing as a classification of the ways in which 
men may arrive at an error: it is much to be doubted whether there ever can be” (De Morgan 1847, 237; 
as cited in Hansen 2002,147; see also Hamblin 1970, 13). Whether the fallacy theory as an error theory of 
sorts can be conceived of or not, the link between fallaciousness and argumentative “goodness” 
(deductive validity, inductive cogency, dialectical appropriateness) cannot be easily undercut. This is 
clear in Hansen’s definition of a fallacy as “an argument that appears to be a better argument of its kind 
than it really is” (Hansen 2002, 152, italics in original). OED’s definition of the straw man as a 
“misrepresented real argument that is easier to defeat” fits in nicely here. Only that it makes the task of 
understanding what a “misrepresented real argument” ever more urgent.  
Before I take up this task, one final clarification is in place. Is the straw man fallacy an 
“argument” in the first place? I have discussed this issue earlier (see Lewiński 2011), and I still think the 
fair solution is this: Committing the straw man fallacy can be seen as (at least) a two-step process 
consisting of: (1) “setting up a straw man,” i.e. unjustifiably representing the opponent’s conclusion or 
premises and (2) “attacking a straw man,” i.e., attacking the misrepresentation as if it were the actual 
conclusion or premises of the opponent. (1) does not necessarily involve an argument. It can be a critical 
question, such as “How many times did you have a sexual intercourse with Miss Lewinsky?”, to which a 
proponent can respond, “I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky; I only said I 
had improper physical relationship with her. Please don’t twist my words around!” Under proper 
contextual circumstances, the first question—“ How many times did you…”—can be seen as a straw man 
that is already “set up,” but is not yet used in some (counter-)argument or other. (2) would likely involve 
a complete argument (something consisting of a conclusion and premises) in which either the conclusion 
or one of the premises relied on the misrepresentation set up in (1). In particular, if the conclusion is 
misrepresented and then refuted as if it were the actual conclusion of the proponent, then we can see the 
straw man as an important subtype of ignoratio elenchi: the classic Aristotelian fallacy of ignoring the 
proper refutation (elenchus). An opponent may even construct a sound (true and valid) argument, just not 
against the conclusion the proponent defended (see Hamblin 1970, 31-32, 87-88; Hansen 2002, 144-145).  
 In any case, rather than being a strictly “logical” fallacy, the straw man is clearly a dialectical 
fallacy occurring in argumentative discussions where something is done to the words (meanings? 
thoughts?) of one’s dialectical opponent (Lewiński 2011, 2012; Lewiński & Oswald 2013; Oswald & 
Lewiński 2014; de Saussure 2018).  
 
3. The semantics of the straw man: In search of “the real argument” 
 
The fact that the OED’s definition of the straw man uses the notion of “an opponent’s real argument” in 
the explanans of the term might be explained away as a necessary encyclopedic simplification which 
resorts to folk terminology in order to be understood by folks. But the argumentation scholars’ habitual 
use of expressions such as “the real argument” or “the real position” when discussing the straw man (see 
Walton 1996, Tindale 2007, 19ff.) deserves some additional critical scrutiny. When working on the issue 
of the charity of interpretation in argumentative exchanges (Lewiński 2012), I was urged by one of the 
two peer reviewers for Informal Logic to similarly treat as a basis for any discussion of complex, even 
suspicious, cases, “the real position” of an arguer, explained as what “the arguer really just means,” or 
“what the arguer’s argument really is.” I never quite understood these comments, even though I still think 
one can discern a mis-representation inherent in the straw man fallacy from some re-representation that 
might just be fine (see also Aikin & Casey 2011).  
 Consider the following examples, due to Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald (2019, 10-11). In these 
cases, Barbara supports a social policy change (It is crucial to better support young parents) resorting to a 
prudential, economic argument (because having a child means a lot of financial charges). Four possible 
reformulations of Barbara’s position put in the mouth of Alexandre have then been analyzed by the 
authors:   
 
(1) Barbara: It is crucial to better support young parents because having a child means a lot of financial 
charges. 
 
(1a) Alexandre: Let's raise the family allowance since having a child means financial ruin. 
(1b) Alexandre: Let's raise the family allowance since it only is about the money. 
(1c) Alexandre: Let's raise the family allowance since having a child can be a financial weight. 
(1b) Alexandre: Let's raise the family allowance since parents are under economic pressure. 
 
Two things are noteworthy here. First, none of Alexandre’s response uses precisely the expressions 
Barbara originally uttered. Yet, one can quickly see that while (1c) and (1d) are more or less acceptable 
paraphrases of Barbara’s utterance, (1a) and (1b) are some kind of misrepresentations, and thus very 
strong straw man candidates. More specifically, (1a) involves an explicit misrepresentation by means of a 
lexical exaggeration of the noun phrase (“financial ruin” instead of “financial charges”), while (1b) an 
implicit misrepresentation by virtue of drawing a contextually illicit pragmatic inference from her 
argument (a possible gloss by Alexandre: “if you exclusively mention financial charges, that implies it’s 
only about the money”) (see Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald 2019, 10-11). Second, I would say—
speaking exclusively for myself, not the authors of the said study—that one can arrive at this judgment 
without quite knowing what Barbara “really just meant.” Let’s even assume that in some private moment 
of utter sincerity, she once said off-record that “the way things are now, it’s really just about money, 
young people are so much afraid of the financial burden that they don’t have kids anymore. We need to 
raise the family allowance or we’ll be a childless, aging society on its way to extinction.” Given the 
public context of the debate one could argue that, confronted with Alexandre’s attack on (1b), she would 
still have the perfect right to object: “Don’t twist my words around! I primarily care about the emotional 
well-being of our families and the future of our country, but I cannot deny that one problem that can be 
solved here and now are financial incentives.” What is her “real position” now?  
 Perhaps I am just strawmanning the concept of a straw man; or rather, the concept of “the real 
man,” the “actually meant real argument” of one’s opponent. So let me go carefully through the 
argument, resorting to another example. Consider the following exchange between an external candidate 
for a head of department at a university (A), and a search committee member (B):  
 
(2) 
A: I think I am the right candidate for the job, I have written a number of books on the topic.  
 
B: Excuse me, sir, but so far as I can see you have only one book published on the topic with you as the 
single or first author.  
 
A: Well, with all due respect, please don’t twist my words around, I never said all these books were 
published with me as the sole or first author. I often write with two of my colleagues. Besides, another 
book is written, submitted, and accepted for publication, but not out yet (it will be early next year). Finally, 
my last individual monograph is actually written, and about to be submitted for evaluation to a very 
prestigious university press.  
 
B: Why would you even mention in this context a manuscript that is not even submitted?! We’re evaluating 
people based on their actual results, not imagined plans… 
 
Again, was A’s “real argument” or “real position” that he should get a job (conclusion) because he has 
“written a number of books on the topic” (premise), this including books published with him as a second 
or third author, books written but not published yet, perhaps even books “written” but waiting quietly on 
his hard disk for better times? Or maybe he “just meant” published, real books, including those merely 
co-authored by him, but excluding edited volumes, books written but not published yet, short eBooks etc. 
Did A have any “real position” that a reasonable dialectical opponent could and even should “interpret 
[…] as carefully and accurately as possible” (rule 10 of pragma-dialectics, see van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1992, 196)? In general, can we “decide what an arguer’s real position actually is” (Tindale 
2007, 26), perhaps based on the idea that “words mean what they mean” and, as such, have some kind of 
an “original meaning,” as some legal scholars would claim (see Ludlow 2014, 64ff.)?  
 Well, an irreverent response could be that “here as elsewhere it doesn’t make much sense to 
divine what the words originally meant—the authors may not have given it any thought” (Ludlow 2014, 
59). Do professors writing books have a crystal-clear grasp of what books “really are”? It would seem 
not. Do institutions employing book writers—such as universities—have a crystal-clear grasp of what 
books “really are”? It would seem not. Some of them might be favorable to your promotion or tenure if 
you “have a book” in the sense of a prestigious edited volume. Some not. Some would flatly dismiss an 
eBook openly accessible via your library’s depository. Some would count it in. Etcetera.  
 Note, these are not primarily empirical arguments, although to an extent they can be. In 
particular, the example above is not an empirically observed and transcribed conversation. Instead, it is a 
made-up case that I invented ripping off Ludlow’s (2014) opening example of how underdetermined the 
very concept of a ‘book’ is. ‘Book’ is such a basic word in English, and many other languages, but still, 
as Ludlow observes, “even after a millennium of shared usage the meaning is quite open-ended” (2014, 
1). Because of this, in the case reported by Ludlow, his position as a writer himself can be that he has 
“written two or three or six or ten books” (2014, 1) without any change to the facts on the ground.  
 This, of course, has serious consequences for how argumentative exchanges—such as the one 
during a somewhat fraught job interview—develop and, indeed, what they are about. One of the things 
that happen in argumentative discussions is that both speakers legitimately and quite ordinarily modulate 
an underdetermined meaning—and they do so in a strategically advantageous manner (Lewiński 2011, 
2012). Think of the book argument advanced by the aspiring department chair. Unsurprisingly, his 
opponent (the bitchy committee member) would likely endorse the most stringent meaning of a ‘book’ as 
a substantive text, written exclusively or primarily by a specific author, and published by an esteemed 
international press. The proponent, the job candidate, could possibly stretch the meaning to the other 
extreme: why not include a collection of essays edited by me and a colleague that is still to be sent to the 
publisher, and will be freely available as an eBook in our university’s digital library? Depending on the 
purported meaning, the argument of the candidate could be numerically glossed as, “hire me, I have eight 
books on the topic,” while the critique of the committee member as, “I don’t think you’re a strong 
candidate, just one book…” None of them would likely intentionally misrepresent some “real position” 
grounded in some “real meaning” of the concept of ‘book’—just because, so the underdetermination of 
meaning argument goes, there is no such real meaning. Dorr & Hawthorne’s concept of “semantic 
plasticity” conveys this idea very well: “the meaning or content attributed by a particular semantic 
proposition belongs to a large set of “candidate” meanings or contents, all of which are roughly alike in 
the respects that seem to matter for the expression relation” (2014, 288).  
 But would not all this take down the real dialectic, where arguers discuss substantive issues, the 
facts on the ground, off its pedestal and into the realm of semantic quibbles and merely verbal disputes 
(see Chalmers 2011; Krabbe & van Laar 2019)? Isn’t there simply a real book, on whose meaning the 
arguers should settle before getting down to the real business of discussing serious issues at hand such as 
tenures and promotions, rather than mere words, words, words? A real and ideal book in the Platonic 
sense, perhaps?  
 
I agree that Plato is elucidating a number of important concepts and they are getting more and more precise, 
but I don’t agree that this is because we are getting closer to the concepts themselves as they rest in Plato’s 
heaven. I would argue that we are merely coming up with better and better modulations—or if you prefer, 
we are constructing better and better concepts. What makes them better is not that they are closer to some 
perfect target, but rather that […] we are coming up with progressively more serviceable modulations via a 
normatively constrained process of argumentation. (Ludlow 2014, 111)  
  
This, admittedly, is an argument well-known since Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of meaning and 
his critique of “the myth of the museum”: 
 
Uncritical semantics is the myth of a museum in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. 
[…] Seen according to the museum myth, the words and sentences of a language have their determinate 
meanings. To discover the meanings of the native’s words we may have to observe his behavior, but still 
the meanings of the words are supposed to be determinate in the native’s mind, his mental museum, even in 
cases where behavioral criteria are powerless to discover them for us. When on the other hand we 
recognize with Dewey that “meaning ... is primarily a property of behavior,” we recognize that there are no 
meanings, nor likenesses nor distinctions of meaning, beyond what are implicit in people’s dispositions to 
overt behavior. (Quine 1968, 186-187) 
 
What emerges from Quine’s critique of the “uncritical semantics” where words and sentences are attached 
to fixed and determined meanings is, then, semantics which instead acknowledges an intrinsic relationship 
between the way we use our words and our concepts. Our conversational interactions—and argumentative 
interactions in particular—are where our dynamic and underdetermined meanings are put to the critical 
test and, hopefully, become somewhat sharper. Some kind of a conceptual clarification and resulting 
mutual understanding of what the other means are thus likely the results of—not the prerequisites for—
reasonable, “normatively constrained” argumentative discussions. 
 Of course, critics of the strong indeterminacy thesis (Quine: there is no fact of the matter 
regarding real meanings) and the weaker underdetermination thesis (Davidson, Ludlow: meanings can be 
sharpened and mutually agreed on) point to the fact that communication typically is successful, that 
speakers often impart their mental contents to others without great effort (Pagin 2008). This, of course, 
has not escaped the attention of Quine (1960, 1968) and those after him. The crucial point here is that our 
theories of meaning need to be sensitive to the possibility of entirely legitimate processes of 
argumentation over meaning, recently described in some detail under the terms of meaning negotiations, 
meaning litigation, metalinguistic disputes, or conceptual engineering (Cappelen 2018; Ludlow 2014; 
Plunkett 2015; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019). Once this weaker argument is recognized, not everything 
that looks, walks, and talks like a straw man turns out to be a straw man.  
 All the same, argumentation theorists dedicated to the study of fallacies are often bound to the 
Aristotelian tradition of analyzing abuses of argumentation (see Hamblin 1970; Hansen 2002; Hansen & 
Pinto 1995). This is not surprising, given Aristotle’s foundational contributions to the study of 
argumentation and his historical prominence. One enduring idea is to divide fallacies into those dependent 
on language (in dictione) and those outside of language (extra dictionem) (Aristotle, Sophistical 
Refutations; Hamblin 1970, Chs. 2-3). Aristotle indeed provided a very powerful catalogue of what can 
go wrong with the use of language in argumentative discourse, this including the problems of ambiguity 
and equivocation, the cornerstone of the theories of semantic underdetermination. Some even claim this is 
all there is to fallacies. Powers (1995) proposes his “One Fallacy Theory” departing from precisely this 
assumption: 
 
[One Fallacy Theory] insists that there is no fallacy unless there is a clearly specifiable appearance of 
validity (or goodness of whatever kind). Since I believe there is no clear way to make an argument appear 
to have a goodness it really lacks except by playing with ambiguities, every real fallacy will turn out to be a 
fallacy of equivocation. (Powers 1995, 290) 
 
Indeed, attention to the linguistic treacherousness of fallacies, and especially the clearly language-based 
fallacies such as the straw man, is a sine qua non condition in any comprehensive treatment of fallacies 
(see our arguments in Lewiński & Oswald 2013 and Oswald & Lewiński 2014). As repeatedly noted, 
however (Tindale 2007, Walton 1996), the straw man—its Ancient Greek structural or functional 
equivalent, that is—has not been among the fallacies recognized by Aristotle. Moreover, as already 
mentioned, the nearest possible classical counterpart would be ignoratio elenchi, curiously, a fallacy not 
based in language. As a result, Powers, who avowedly follows Aristotle in his treatment of fallacies 
dependent on language, has nothing to say about the straw man. Instead, he propounds his theory based 
on the following semantics of ambiguity:  
 
All the fallacies involve playing with ambiguities. So we divide the different types of ambiguity. A 
sentence is built out of words or word-parts or phrases to which meanings are conventionally assigned. The 
meanings of the ultimate meaningful parts are said to be lexically assigned. Thus in “rented” a meaning is 
assigned to “rent” and one to the part “ed.” The phrase "fell off the wagon" may be understood literally in 
terms of its parts “fell,” “off,” “the,” and “wagon,” or lexically as a whole receive the meaning “went back 
to drinking.” The lexically meaningful parts are then put together grammatically to make up the sentence. 
If a lexical part has more than one meaning, we have a lexical ambiguity. (Sometimes 
“equivocation” is used in a narrower sense than mine to cover only lexical equivocations.) If the lexical 
parts are unambiguous, but it is ambiguous how the parts are grammatically put together, we have a 
grammatical ambiguity, also called an amphiboly. (Powers 1995, 291)  
 
What is the “conventionally assigned” meaning of a ‘book’? If there isn’t one, perhaps we are constantly 
committing the fallacy of equivocation whenever mentioning a “book”? We can even make this point 
more precise: while the notion of ‘book’ is perhaps not ambiguous, whereby two or more determinate 
meanings are “conventionally assigned” to the same word (like in “bank” or “runs”), it is nonetheless 
vague, in the sense that we don’t have a determinate concept in the first place, as discussed above. Even 
in this case, however, it would fall under the “One Fallacy Theory” (Powers 1995, 297-298). If we follow 
the arguments of the semantic underdeterminists, we would then have a systemic implosion of the fallacy 
of equivocation in any use of language—and the corresponding shrinking of the straw man fallacy to only 
most blatant abuses (for then the “error” would lie in the vague expression in the first place, not in the 
attacker’s misrepresentation).  
 How can this reductio ad absurdum be averted? One famous response it to abandon natural 
language as inherently vague and turn instead to formal logic as a proper area of inquiry into inference 
and argument (see Grice 1989, for a well-known exposition and criticism of this argument). Another, 
noted in passing by Powers, is to resort to semantic conventionalism (for a recent account, see Lepore & 
Stone 2015): there are socially recognized conventions that might quite precisely determine the meaning 
of a given term in a specific context of use. There might even be some kind of institutional ontology 
around a concept such as a ‘book’ (see Searle 2010), an ontology that would define what counts as a book 
in a given context (e.g., “a (co-authored), peer-reviewed scientific text of 50.000 words or more, 
published as an individual volume at one of the commercial or university presses officially indexed in the 
Web of Science”). Conventionalism, however, cannot account for many phenomena of rational linguistic 
communication, as argued by intentionalists (e.g., Strawson 1964; Grice 1989; Sperber & Wilson 1995): 
much of what is communicated is grounded in what speakers intend to convey, over and above the literal, 
explicit meanings, via the process of pragmatic inference, notably implicatures. Finally, one might want 
to resort to semantic minimalism and claim that at bottom there is a minimal, fixed meaning, grounded in 
the literal meaning of non-indexical expressions, or to semantic contextualism that would instead insist 
that the meaning of propositions is always contextually-variant, open to contextually-relevant pragmatic 
enrichment, especially in the case of indexicals (see Cappelen & Lepore 2005, for a discussion).  
 Now, I am mentioning these obvious facts only in an encyclopedically simplified form. But even 
in this form they allow me to sketch two conclusions, both of which are almost grim for argumentation 
theory. First, the discipline, in its attempts to define what rational argumentative interaction is, is bound 
by the principle requiring arguers to have clear and distinct definitions of concepts ready prior to any 
meaningful dispute. If the speakers do not mutually agree on the meanings and definitions of terms, they 
are in effect talking past each other, sinking ever deeper in their futile misunderstandings rather than 
resolving worthwhile disagreements. In many practical contexts this is, of course, a reasonable 
requirement: colloquially speaking, “we need to know what we’re talking about,” so as to avoid a merely 
verbal dispute and instead produce some fruitful dialectic.  
 However, this colloquial idea does not easily pass muster of critical scrutiny. Geach, in his 
analysis of Plato’s first Socratic dialogue, Euthyphro, calls it a Socratic fallacy and insists on the 
following:  
 
Let us be clear that this is a fallacy, and nothing better. It has stimulated philosophical enquiry, but still it is 
a fallacy. We know heaps of things without being able to define the terms in which we express our 
knowledge. Formal definitions are only one way of elucidating terms; a set of examples may in a given 
case be more useful than a formal definition. (Geach 1966, 371) 
   
This criticism has not lost its currency today. Quite the contrary, as already discussed above, it fuels 
recent discussions of meaning underdetermination and the value of metalinguistic disputes. Among 
others, Plunkett & Sundell argue that “the assumption that sameness of meaning is necessary for the 
expression of genuine disagreement is what leads so many theorists to ascribe meanings to speakers that 
systematically diverge from those speakers’ usage and first-order intuitions” (2019, 18). 
 That is to say, in its allegiance to the Ancient Greek principles, such as the priority of definitions 
and determination of meanings, the discipline might be committing a fallacy itself. This brings me to the 
second grim point: even assuming that these principles are defensible—in many ordinary contexts they 
perhaps even are—argumentation theory has not produced its clear position on how the allegedly fixed 
and definable meanings can actually be fixed: by linguistic conventions alone, by speakers’ intentions, by 
contextual features, by the circumstances of evaluation, etcetera, etcetera. As a result, when discussing the 
straw man and other fallacies of language, the discipline resorts to textbook quality explanations and folk 
concepts such as “what the arguer really just means.” In this way—involuntarily, one would hope—it 
produces its baby semantics for absolute beginners. This raises the suspicion that argumentation theory is 
a biblia pauperum of sorts, a largely pedagogical discipline meant to translate the complexities of logic 
and the philosophy of language to “dummies” interested in everyday argumentation. 
Now, in all fairness, when it comes to the straw man fallacy argumentation scholars are aware of 
the fact that concepts such as “the real argument,” “the real position,” or “the standpoint actually 
advanced” are idealizations that might not necessarily work well in actual discussions.i However, for ease 
of exposition (that’s my best guess), they still discuss the puzzles involved parenthetically—and, in any 
case, treat them as practical problems of implementation rather than theoretical issues in semantics that 
need to be, one way or another, addressed.  
 One final remark before getting out of the dark: here, I focus exclusively on the semantics of the 
straw man fallacy, while, together with Steve Oswald, I treated its pragmatics in other work (esp. 
Lewiński 2011; Lewiński & Oswald 2013; Oswald & Lewiński 2014). Thanks in part to the pragmatic 
theories of argumentation, such as pragma-dialectics (see esp. van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & 
Jacobs 1993), the pragmatic phenomena of argumentative exchanges have received closer attention. This 
attention has recently turned into a serious empirical program of investigating the linguistic and pragmatic 
details of various forms of possible straw man (see de Saussure 2018; Schumann, Zufferey & Oswald 
2019; Müller 2020).  
 
4. The dialectic of the straw man 
 
The discussion in the previous section lets me also formulate the guiding principle for this section, 
namely: playing on the meaning of words or phrases is not necessarily a straw man. It might instead be a 
necessary, indeed valuable, contribution to a collective conceptual refinement of vague, ambiguous, 
unclear, or otherwise underdetermined terms.  
Above, I already suggested what the possible relation between the concept of open-ended, 
underdetermined meanings and an argumentative discussion can be. Part and parcel of an argumentative 
exchange in natural language would not only be an argumentative contest over the “facts on the ground” 
but also a dispute over the meaning of the words used. These two aspects—traditionally dichotomized 
into, respectively, substantive and verbal disputes—have intricate relations that are yet to be fully 
appreciated (see Balcerak Jackson 2014; Chalmers 2011; Plunkett 2015; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019; 
Rott 2015; Vermeulen 2018; for some of the recent contributions to the debate). The meaning is, of 
course, consequential for how a given position can be defended and objected to—it would be utterly 
surprising, then, if arguers were not attentive to this element in their discussions. How can this process be 
grasped in terms of argumentation? 
 To start with, I will assume an adversarial view on argumentative discussions, not unlike the 
classic Socratic elenchus referred to above, or its contemporary rendering in pragma-dialectics (see 
Lewiński 2011, 2012, 2017 for a detailed defense). Arguers are out to defend their position on an issue 
and have it accepted by their critics. To this end, they go through an agonistic process of advancing 
arguments, asking critical questions, providing counterarguments, etc. This process, while agonistic and 
thus likely strategic, is also inherently cooperative: for the whole process to be reasonable and simply 
meaningful, arguers need to follow some basic rules, such as those defining relevant types of speech acts, 
acceptable inferences (formal and informal), possible responses to an opponent’s contributions, and 
commitments that arguers are bound to undertake or retract, as needed (see Hamblin 1970). It is, shortly, 
both a normative and a strategic endeavor (see van Eemeren 2010).  
 Now, whenever some term—such as “book”—is underdetermined it will characteristically have 
various plausible interpretations (“modulations”, in Ludlow’s 2014, parlance), some of them benefitting 
one arguer, and others her opponent. Let’s return to our job interview and the book argument. As already 
described, the job candidate would most likely stretch the concept of ‘book’ to its widest possible 
extension, including edited books, eBooks, and written manuscripts, even those still under review. By 
contrast, the uncharitable committee member would likely say something like, “Let’s be professional 
about it, this is a professional context, right? For me a ‘book’ is, I quote, ‘a (co-)authored, peer-reviewed 
scientific text of 50.000 words or more, published as an individual volume at one of the commercial or 
university presses officially indexed in the Web of Science.’ You have merely one of those, and I hope 
I’ll die in a ditch before we have a department chair like that.” The job candidate can then respond, 
“That’s just like, your opinion, man… I quote from the APA’s recent rulebook where a book means ‘a 
substantive text written or edited by a scholar, and published through traditional or digital channels, or 
considered for such publication’. I have eight of those, you won’t get a better hire!” Importantly, 
throughout this process, neither of them is misrepresenting the (real?) concept of ‘book’, but rather 
modulating it to his or her own dialectical advantage. And, as long as their arguments are reasonable—
those above probably are—they are not only not committing a straw man (nor any other fallacy of 
language described by Powers 1995), but rather engaging in a strategically understandable and, 
potentially, conceptually fruitful elenchus over the meaning in question.ii 
Yet, one cannot deny that straw men do happen: Aikin & Casey (2011, 2016) are surely right 
about that. My argument so far has been limited to underdetermined terms—but many would argue this 
pertains to virtually all our vocabulary (“What exactly does ‘3 o’clock’ mean?”; see Ludlow 2014), or at 
least to the most important part of it (“Is waterboarding ‘torture’?”; see Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), 
or least to the most esteemed and famous part of the most important part (“Is our will ‘free’?”; see 
Chalmers 2011). Still, let’s bar meaning underdetermination for a second as a philosophers’ gibberish. 
Here’s a semantic straw man:  
 
(3) 
A: I won’t go there again. The food was pretty bland, and expensive for that.  
B: Well, no, I myself didn’t find it inedible. And the company paid, so what’s the problem?   
 
‘Bland’ and ‘inedible’ cannot easily be modulated so as to be one and the same concept—all the troubles 
regarding the predicates of personal taste notwithstanding (see Stojanovic, 2007). So we clearly have a 
straw man here. But real examples—I again invented this one—are hardly ever so simple. Meticulous 
analyses of actual cases (see Lewiński 2011; Lewiński & Oswald 2013; Oswald & Lewiński 2014) reveal 
that much of the difficulty rests in the pragmatic aspect of natural language: strawmanners may astutely 
manipulate various types of pragmatic inference in order to cover up and get away with the abuse. Here, 
as already mentioned, I limit myself to the semantic issues—all the troubles regarding the semantics-
pragmatics distinction notwithstanding, again (see Plunkett & Sundell 2019, for a discussion in the 
context of metalinguistic negotiations).  
 In any case, the dialectical discussion over meanings should be governed by “a normatively 
constrained process of argumentation” (Ludlow 2014, 111). For Ludlow, this process is primarily 
grounded in analogical argumentation: one would argue analogically from undisputed, canonical cases, 
thus tracking the important properties of the term as applied in the new context of the current dispute. 
Importantly, much has to do with the contextual conditions of the debate: the question of whether a ‘fetus’ 
is a ‘person’ can lead to a very different answer in the strictly legal, strictly medical, or strictly religious 
context. That is, different arguments from analogy would be deemed reasonable in various context of an 
argumentative discussion over meanings.  
 
Table 1. Contextual precision and charity of interpretation 
 
 Precise interpretation Loose interpretation  
Highly critical (uncharitable)  Criminal trial, blind academic 
review, job interview? 
Political debates  
Constructive (charitable)  Doctor-patient consultation, 
classroom discussion, 
conference presentation? 
Small friendly talk,  
family dinner table  
 
In my earlier work (see Lewiński 2011; 2012; Lewiński & Oswald 2013), I have advocated 
similar contextual conditions for what I have called an intersubjective interpretation procedure. When in 
dispute over the meaning of their expressions—which can be triggered by the straw man attempts or straw 
man accusations—arguers need to abide by two crisscrossing criteria of interpretation: the precision 
required by the context at hand and the charity of interpretation. The resulting simple matrix of four 
options is presented in Table 1. 
In the first place, various forms of institutionalized activities offer precise rules of interpretation 
of discourse. Legal discourse is a paradigmatic example here—but so is any specialized context, including 
perhaps a job interview at a university, where a ‘book’ can mean a specific type of scholarly publication, 
rather than just any longer written text. Other contexts in the private or public sphere may allow for more 
laxity in meaning, thereby making a meaning dispute ever more likely and the straw man ever more 
unlikely. In the second place, one can distinguish between charitable (constructive) and uncharitable 
(critical) argumentative contexts. A certain expectation of constructive or critical engagement affects the 
contextually appropriate level of meaning nit-pickiness. Compare an argument over an experiment in a 
high-school chemistry class with cross-examination in a criminal trial: while similar levels of precision 
might be required in both contexts, the classroom discussion calls for the interpretive benefit of the doubt, 
when necessary, at least on the part of the teacher. As a result, in the classroom context the attacks on 
interpretations which are plausible, but less than charitable, can be seen as attacks on straw men, whereas 
they would be seen as tough but overall reasonable criticisms in the legal context. As for our job 
interview: there doesn’t seem to exist any firm convention regarding the levels of necessary charity, but 
an interrogative, even bitchy, critical attitude of the committee members seem to be one recognizable 
option for a job interview. Similarly for the precision of rules of interpretation: there might be 
institutional regulations defining what counts as a ‘book’, or ‘an academic publication’ at large, and in 
this case arguers should in principle be bound by them. Only “in principle,” however, because descriptive 
metalinguistic disputes, with arguments resorting to how a term actually is used by some authority, 
institution, or by custom, do not preclude normative metalinguistic disputes, where arguments turn on 
how a term ought to be used, even despite the currently accepted, prevalent, or even mandated meaning 
(Plunkett 2015; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019).  
To sum up, arguers should conduct their argumentative discussions with these general rules in 
mind. Depending on the contextual conditions, meaning disputes will be more or less open to arguers’ 
modulating the meaning of the words, and, respectively, less or more rigid when it comes to the straw 
man identification.   
 
5. Conclusion: toward meaning argumentativism 
 
Before reaching an optimistic conclusion, let me first summarize the argument of the entire paper in three 
sentences. In order to identify the straw man fallacy, we need to have some idea of how to adjudicate 
between the meaning of the original arguments and the meanings attributed in the alleged straw man 
attack. There are various ways of solving this semantic predicament: we can rely on the intention of the 
original arguer (“No, no, don’t twist my words around, I meant…”), on some governing convention (“At 
our university “x” means ‘x’”), on mutual agreement between speakers (“For the current purposes, let us 
define “x” as ‘x’”), etc. And while none of these solutions is fully satisfactory—by virtue of each of them 
being unreflectively tied to spurious assumptions regarding the determination of meaning—one possible 
idea is to resort to the contextual criteria of precision and constructiveness of linguistic usage and vary 
our fallacy judgements accordingly.  
 The optimistic conclusion is that whereas argumentation theory has not been capable of 
producing or even resorting to some defensible theory of meaning, it can find a solution in its own midst. 
The varied contextual criteria proposed above allow us to undermine the dubious assumptions about 
meaning and come up with a less-than-grim solution. I will call this solution meaning argumentativism. In 
a sense, it has been argued for all along this chapter through my critical arguments and the analyses of 
examples; yet, I surely haven’t been able to express it in so few a word Donald Davidson did when he 
spoke about “the cooperative reworking of verbal usage that occurs in dialectical exchange” (1994, 435). 
Analyzing Plato’s Euthyphro—the exact same dialogue that led Geach to identify the Socratic fallacy—
Davidson declares the he sees “the Socratic elenchus as a crucible in which some of our most important 
words, and the concepts they express, are tested, melted down, reshaped, and given a new edge” (1994, 
435):  
 
As they try to understand each other, people in open discussion use the same words, but whether they mean 
the same things by those words, or mean anything clear at all, only the process of question and answer can 
reveal. […] If it attains its purpose, an elenctic discussion is an event in which the meanings of words, the 
concepts entertained by the speakers, evolve and are clarified. In this respect it is a model of every 
successful attempt at communication. (Davidson 1994, 432)  
 
This is more than little praise for the role of argumentation in our communication. But it’s also an 
indictment and a challenge to abandon the baby semantics of “the real argument” and engage in serious 
reconsideration of the functions of argumentative discussions. Instead of being a sine qua non condition 
for meaningful argumentative discussions, semantic clarification and refinement is their result, and often 
a precious one. As I have argued, the analysis of one single fallacy, the straw man, can be a good point of 
entry into such reconsideration. Yes, it will likely make the straw man a concept more obscure than our 
students need, but it can also lead us to a better understanding of what argumentation, and argumentation 
theory, is about. 
 
 
i To give but two, but prominent and quite representative, examples: 
“In practice, the differences between the attacked standpoint and the original standpoint will often be quite subtle. 
By design, the opponent’s words are so twisted that it becomes at the same time easy for the distorter to tackle and 
difficult for an outsider to tell whether justice is being done to the original standpoint.” (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst 1992, 127–128).  
“Because of the various kinds of problems and trickiness in determining what an arguer’s position really is in a 
given case, it can be easy to get this wrong, and to mistake an arguer’s real position for something else that is not her 
real position, but only appears to be. This is the essence of the deception or error inherent in the straw man fallacy as 
a distinctive type of sophistical tactic. […] It is important to realize that the job of determining what an arguer’s 
commitments really are, or may fairly be taken to be, in a real case, is by no means trivial” (Walton 1996, 125-126). 
ii However, there is a difference between attributing to the protagonist a meaning that patently misrepresents the 
meaning he intended, and signaled as intended, and advancing a reasonable metalinguistic argument. Compare the 
committee member’s retort, “Well, if any written text is a ‘book’ to you, I have written about 237 of them!”, with, “I 
see what you’re trying to say, but at our university ‘books’ are only published books, period.” While in both cases 
the protagonist (the job candidate) can claim to “own” the meaning or at least have some meaning precedence, only 
in the former case could he justifiably issue a straw man accusation (“Don’t twist my words around!”). As a 
consequence, assuming both retorts of the committee member are metalinguistic arguments, meaning disputes can 
still include moves which commit a straw man fallacy. (Thank you to Steve Oswald for pointing this out!)  
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